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Change that Matters: An Essay on State
Constitutional Development
Daniel B. Rodriguez'
A sharp focus on state constitutional change brings into relief many
related matters of state constitutionalism-how should we think about
state constitutional development in a world in which state constitutions
are frequently amended or revised? What political struggles take place
on a battleground in which formal change may be the ultimate prize?
How effectively do courts enforce procedural rules which purport to
regulate processes of change? What light do positive theories of state
politics, judicial behavior, and constitutional design shed on our
normative perspectives on state constitutionalism in either a first or a
second-best world? These are, of course, interrelated issues. And the
emerging (and converging) fields of state constitutional law and
American constitutional development promise to help us better negotiate
these issues.2
What we learn from modern scholarly perspectives on American
constitutional development is essentially this: the relationship between
law and politics is unavoidable and essential to understanding the
dynamics of constitutionalism and constitutional change. Therefore,
whatever focal point we have in mind in our consideration of state
constitutional matters, we must attend to the ubiquitous considerations of
1. Minerva House Drysdale Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas School of
Law; Professor of Government (by courtesy). I thank the many participants in the Penn
State Conference at which the issues in this essay were discussed and, especially,
Jamison Colburn, Gary Gildin, and the law student editors for their extraordinary work in
managing this conference. I also thank the Columbia Law School, where I served as the
Stephen & Barbara Friedman Visiting Professor during the semester in which this essay
was written.
2. On the renaissance of interest in, and scholarly analysis of, state constitutions
and constitutionalism, see, e.g., NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (James
A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, eds., 2011); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN
STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2009).
3. This has been a key theme in the contemporary work of leading state
constitutional law scholars including, among others, JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2009) and CONSTITUTIONAL PoLTICS IN THE STATES:
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND HISTORICAL PATTERNS (G. Alan Tarr, ed., 1996).
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both law and politics. In this symposium essay, I consider how this
advised focus on law and politics-or what I call constitutional
law/politics in high fidelity-illuminates the complex matter of state
constitutional change.
While the relevance of this inquiry is not unique to state
constitutions and constitutionalism, some special characteristics of state
law and politics in the American constitutional system make this a topic
of compelling importance. First, state constitutions are famously more
malleable than is the U.S. Constitution;4 hence the circumstances in
which change takes place-through formal means, to say nothing about
informal means-are much more common in the state constitutional
context.5 Second, and relatedly, the dynamics of social movements and
direct political action are magnified given the real possibilities of
implementing constitutional change.6 Third, elected state judges ignore
powerful political pressures at their peril. They need to be-and likely
are in reality-more closely attuned to the connection between legal
judgments and political ramifications.7 Fourth, the availability of direct
constitutional change through the initiative system in many states
obviously amplifies the persistent political considerations in the law.'
Fifth, and finally, politics at the sub-national level implicate more
conspicuously democratic values and circumstances.9
4. On comparisons between state and federal constitutional change, see WILLIAMS,
supra note 2, at 359-97; Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State
Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS, Winter 1982, at 57, 57 (1982).
5. See generally Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into
Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 1629, 1641-43 (2010); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions:
The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1163 (1999)
(describing state constitutions as "more plastic and porous").
6. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES,
at xiii, xv (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996) ("Far from viewing their constitutions as sacrosanct
and above politics, the states have treated them as political documents to be changed in
accordance with the shifting needs and opinions of their citizens").
7 See generally, David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2090 (2010) ("judicial rulings are more easily and frequently
overridden at the state level").
8. See id. at 2089-90. See also JOHN MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE
INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004); ELISABETH GERBER,
POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT
LEGISLATION (1999); Elizabeth Garrett, The Promise and Perils ofHybrid Democracy, 59
OKLA. L. REV. 2 (2006).
9. From one perspective, this is tied to the Jeffersonian idea of small-level
democracy and the superiority of localism on this standard to more centralized (and
centralizing) tendencies. See, e.g., David Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces
of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 787 (1999). From another, the
fulfillment of this idea is grounded in the complex dynamic between national, state, and
local governance. What is or is not "democratic," in this view, depends upon how state
constitutionalism interacts with national constitutional objectives. See, e.g., ROBERT
1074 [Vol. 115:4
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Framed around the argument that state constitutional change is
simultaneously about both law and politics, my essay has two distinct
objectives. The first, and more ambitious of the two objectives, is to
explain how and why theories of state constitutional development
flounder unless they are conspicuously attentive to considerations of
politics and political strategy and the positive political theory of legal
decision-making. My second objective is to reinforce this abstract
argument with a specific doctrinal example, the distinction in state
constitutional law between revisions and amendments.o While this
distinction implicates key constitutional values, judicial interpretations
have been incoherent and vexing. That courts have lurched toward and
away from particular lodestars in implementing this distinction suggests
the difficulties of undertaking state constitutional interpretation without
due account of the peculiar dynamics of state constitutional politics.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS IN HIGH FIDELITY
State constitutionalism is best understood as an admixture of
political and legal choice.1 Law takes place in the shadow of politics,
and political activities are implemented within legal frameworks, in light
of legal rules and interpretations. Accordingly, any meaningful account
of state constitutional development must be scrupulously attentive to the
dynamic relationship between law and politics and, more ambitiously,
have a theory in mind that makes sense of this relationship and provides
traction for prescriptive analysis and normative assessment.
A. Law Meets Politics
To say that legal rules and interpretations take place in the shadow
of politics is to say something that is at the same time banal and vital.
That political choice has an impact on judicial outcomes is a rather
conventional insight that is dug deep into the ground of American public
law.12 More provocative is the claim, sketched in some of the leading
SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM (2009); Lawrence Sager, Cool Federalism and the
Life Cycle ofMoral Progress, in NEW FRONTIERS, supra note 2, at 15-24.
10. For a valuable historical perspective on the revision/amendment distinction, see
DINAN, supra note 3, at 29-63. See infra text accompanying notes 46-50.
11. An observation we could make, as well, about American constitutionalism more
generally. See, e.g., DONALD LuTz, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (2006);
Walter F. Murphy, Designing a Constitution: OfArchitects and Builders, 87 TEX. L. REv.
1303 (2009). Indeed, we need not necessarily limit this observation to the U.S. See, e.g.,
ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS (2009); Ran Hirschl, The 'Design Sciences' and Constitutional Success,
87 TEx. L. REv. 1339 (2009).
12. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2010); ROBERT
MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT ( 5 h ed. 2010); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
2011]1 1075
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political science work of this and previous generations, that judges are
influenced in their decision-making by political choice and strategy.13
Taking this claim as roughly accurate, we still need an explanation, one
rooted in both theory and empirics, of just how legal rules, and the
application of these rules in cases, cut at the relevant joints of American
political practice.
The developing work in law and positive political theory ("L/PPT")
approaches this question by positing an informed, dynamic relationship
among political and legal institutions in the framework of
policymaking.14 Court-legislature relations are modeled as a game, a
game in which legal rules and interpretations are configured in light of
expected legislative and executive reactions.15 By reasoning inductively
and purposively,16 lawmakers and judges can calibrate their decisions to
the expected reactions of other institutions and officials who matter.
From the judiciary's perspective, "the ubiquitous possibility of
congressional override of judicial . .. interpretation shapes judicial
behavior." 7 L/PPT explains how decision-making is conducted within
the structure of the incentives, opportunities, and obstacles present and
prevalent in all institutions in government.' 8 In short, L/PPT presents a
picture of dynamic policymaking which helps us better to understand just
how law meets politics.' 9 In fact, "[T]he emerging PPT literature on the
judiciary and the role of law stresses the political nature of legal
decision-making and the dynamic relationship among the legislative,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
(1999).
13. See, e.g., FRANK CROSS & STEFANIE LINDQUIST, MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
(2009); RICHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008); HAROLD SPAETH & JEFFREY
SEGAL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
14. For an excellent expository essay on this work, see Rui J.P. deFigueiredo, Jr.,
Tonja Jacobi, & Barry R. Weingast, The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to
American Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECoNOMY 200 (Barry R.
Weingast & Donald Wittman, eds., 2006).
15. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7
Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing
the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991).
16. For an accessible analysis of how backward induction is critical to the game
theoretic analysis ungirding the PPT approach, see KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING
POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 163-67 (2d. 2010). See generally
DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING (1990).
17. De Figueiredo, supra note 14, at 209.
18. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of
Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. I (1994).
19. Much of the analysis in the L/PPT paradigm builds upon the model introduced in
an unpublished paper by Brian Marks. See Brian Marks, A Model of Judicial Influence
on Congressional Policy-Making: Grove City College v. Bell (1988) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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executive, and judicial branches."2 0 From this vantage point, we can
consider myriad normative questions, not the least of which is how best
to construct schemes of legal rules in the face of this iterative game.
To fuel this consideration, we need to have in mind an idea of what
sort of legal rules are practical and optimal. The fundamental question,
of course, is what we are trying to achieve with our rules. When we
think of political-legal dynamics in the way sketched by L/PPT we may
gravitate toward two opposed prescriptive approaches. We can look to
law as a way of reflecting politics or we can look at law as combating
politics. To help unpack this a bit more, let us distinguish between two
kinds of constitutional decision rules: one that seeks to promote political
incentives and the other that is concerned with controlling political
strategy. The first kind of rule accommodates how government officials
behave; it is a rule that is "incentive compatible." 2' In an optimal world,
these constitutional decisions will not impact political choices in the
sense that officials will find it either easier or harder to make their
choices because of the decisions; rather, they will make choices within
the policy discretion space decried by political officials and with the
purpose of implementing legislative and/or executive goals. The legal-
political game, to put it in specific L/PPT terms, is a self-enforcing
equilibrium.22
A second kind of rule has a different effect. Here, the legal rule has
the effect of disrupting political strategy; it changes the equilibrium by
imposing a new barrier or requirement on legislators, new in the sense
that the rational legislator will act differently than she would if no such
rule were forthcoming.2 3 Legal rules in this way are incentive
incompatible.
As an example of an incentive compatible rule, consider the rules
governing property rights. As Douglas North and various colleagues
have written, secure property rights enable political officials, firms, and
other interested stakeholders to plan effectively and to construct optimal
20. Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Judiciary and the Role of
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 14, at 284.
21. On incentive compatibility more generally, see Kim-Sau Chung & Jeffrey C.
Ely, Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design, 74 REv. ECON. STUD. 447 (2007);
David Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundations of Incentive
Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 440 (2000).
22. See, e.g., Norman Schofield, Evolution of the Constitution, 32 BRITISH J. POL.
SCI. 1, 1 (2002) ("[T]he beliefs that underpin the constitution must themselves generally
be in equilibrium").
23. See, e.g., William Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of
Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences ofJudicial Deference to Legislatures, 74
VA. L. REV. 373 (1988); Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223
(1986).
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bargaining relationships.24 Although, in any particular instance one's ox
may become gored, there is a generally acceptable interest in maintaining
the schemes of property rights in order to protect investment and to
reduce inefficient conflict. Writing in this same political economy
tradition, Barry Weingast has made a similar argument for the creation
and persistence of federalism as a mechanism for preserving markets.2 5
A further example, albeit a bit farther afield from the specific focus on
formal constitutional structure, is the techniques of legal interpretation
which purport to honor the will of the constitution's framers (or, in
connection with statutory interpretation, the framers of the statute). This
is, to be sure, a controversial and problematic endeavor; critics of certain
forms of originalism emphasize both the positive and normative
difficulties of this approach. However, a commitment to the framers'
intent in interpreting constitutions is compatible with the incentives of
legislators to forge agreement and to communicate their intentions
through not only the words of the document, but through probative
legislative history.26
There are also distinct legal rules which can best be viewed as
incentive incompatible. The so-called "single subject" rule, for example,
counters legislator incentives but limits the ability of legislators to strike
political agreements and make tradeoffs in the four corners of a proposed
bill.2 7 Logrolling can, to be sure, be carried out across the terrain of
legislative proposals, but the requirement of simultaneity of exchange, 2 8
a key assumption underlying intra-legislative strategy, is better fulfilled
when the tradeoffs are made within an omnibus proposal that will
ultimately be considered in an up or down vote. The history of the single
subject rule suggests that it was precisely this concern with legislative
logrolling (as well as lawmaking transparency) that generated this
constitutional rule.29 Similarly, the requirement that legislators adopt a
24. See, e.g., DOUGLAS C. NORTH, JOHN JOSEPH WALLIS, & BARRY R. WEINGAST,
VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING
RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY 148-89 (2009).
25. See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
26. See, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political
Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its
Interpretation, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1417 (2003) (discussing how revised approach to
reading legislative history would be incentive compatible).
27. On the "single-subject" rule more generally, see WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 261-
63. For an interesting, recent analysis of the political economy of the single-subject rule,
see Robert Cooter & Michael Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single-
Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (2010).
28. See Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of
Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, are not Organized as Markets, 86 J. POL.
EcoN. 132 (1988).
29. See generally Cooter & Gilbert, supra note 27, at 706-07.
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balanced budget, which is hard-wired in nearly every state constitution,
is incentive incompatible in that it reduces the capacity of legislators to
engage in various fiscal illusions and machinations. Balanced budget
rules, at least in theory, function as a sort of constitutional PAYGO
system - that is, a system that obligates legislators to provide sufficient
funding for their legislative initiatives and, in essence, requires them to
make their tradeoffs more explicit in their budgetary annum.
Finally, certain rules are incentive compatible in some
circumstances but not others. For example, the separation of powers
may conflict with purposive goals by raising the costs of engaging in
forms of political strategy. This effect was very much on the minds of
Madison and Montesquieu;30 political action is rendered more difficult
by checks and balances and schemes that parcel out political power
among formal institutions.31 On this account, the myriad of separation of
powers rules are incompatible with political incentives. But from
another perspective, separation of powers enables officials to invest
capital in their own institutions and to realize gains from specialization
and monopoly.32 Legislators can know that under the formal rendering
of separation of powers, their lawmaking power is exclusive and thus the
benefits accruing from lawmaking power will redound to members of
this and only this institution. Moreover, the extent to which separation of
powers is incentive compatible depends fundamentally upon what we
mean by the separation of powers. Doctrinal line-drawing has been
notoriously difficult, and so the connection between what amounts to a
jurisprudence, rather than a formal structure ("separation of power"
being nowhere delineated exactly in the text of the U.S. Constitution),
can be opaque. Other concepts integral to the so-called "rule of law"
have this quality as well.
This stylized theory is meant to encompass key truths about the
nature of political and legal decision-making in the American system.
We should be careful, however, about making the uncritical move from a
depiction of politics as usual to a normative picture of how politics
engages with core constitutional values. The incentive compatibility
analysis explains how constitutional rules reflect politics, but such rules
are designed, in small or large part, to regulate politics and political
30. See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, vol. 1 (1748) (Thomas Nugent
trans., 1777); THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
31. See generally M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS (1967).
32. See Rui J.P. DeFigueiredo, Jr., Tonja Jacobi, & Barry R. Weingast, The New
Separation-of-PowersApproach to American Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 199, 199 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006).
33. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry R.
Weingast, The Rule ofLaw Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455 (2010).
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behavior. Herein lies the puzzle at the heart of L/PPT: certain formal
rules and structures are needed in order to implement the objectives of
constitutional commitment. This is no less true of state than of national
constitutionalism. Yet, we need and want rules to constrain political
choice in order to implement other key values. It is pursuit of this
second objective where we consider squarely the question of how politics
meets law.
B. Politics Meets Law
In light of this account of legal rules and political strategy, how
should we think about state constitutional rules? The metaphor I proffer
here as a way of thinking coherently about these multifaceted and
multidimensional ideas is constitutional law and politics in high fidelity.
High fidelity is a concept that comes from stereophonics 3 4 and, indeed, is
a rather quaint concept that, in an earlier generation, was swiftly
abbreviated simply as "hi-fi," generally in reference to a stereo system.
Hi-fi reproduction denotes the high-quality reproduction of sound or
images. The quality of this reproduction is measured by the true sound
coming through with minimal amounts of noise and distortion, as well as
an accurate frequency response. This captures, I would suggest, the
critical features of our system of constitutional law and politics. After
all, we have as an ideal a constitution as reflecting our polity's primacy
governance objectives. Not only does the formal architecture of the
document embody these objectives by, for instance, creating workable
governmental institutions, but the processes set in motion by our
constitutional system facilitates good lawmaking and, in a variety of
ways, enables the government to perform its tasks-our tasks-
successfully.35  Many obstacles exist; political pressures and tactics
create distortions in the workability of the original constitutional system.
These are, to be sure, not abnormal events but are ordinary given the
circumstances of retail and wholesale American politics. Still and all,
the distortions and noise created make it difficult to reproduce the quality
of the original constitutional structure.
Constitutional adjudication and formal constitutional change are the
two primary ways in which the system confronts these distortions. To
34. The term "high fidelity" was coined by H.A. Hartley in 1927. See H.A.
HARTLEY, AUDIO DESIGN HANDBOOK 200 (1958). "I invented the phrase," he writes, "to
denote a type of sound reproduction that might be taken rather seriously by a music lover.
In those days the average radio or phonograph equipment sounded pretty horrible but, as
I was really interested in music, it occurred to me that something might be done about it."
Id.
35. On the objects of state constitutions, see Daniel B. Rodriguez, State
Constitutional Failure, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
[Vol. 115:41080
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come back to our stereophonic metaphor, we want a constitutional law
and politics in high fidelity; that is, we want to reproduce our objectives
into functioning policy with a minimum of political noise and distortion.
This will never be achieved perfectly, of course, but then again, neither
will a perfect hi-fi system be manufactured.3 6
C. Perspectives on Constitutional Change
Constitutions are created in order to manage social and political
conflict. They construct rules that, whether or not in the short-term
political interest of government officials, secure a long-range interest in
promoting valuable social investment, reducing the stakes of politics
and thereby what de Figueredo and Weingast called the "rationality of
fear,"38 and in overcoming various coordination problems. The
dilemma is how to accommodate constitutional change in a schema that
prizes, for the reasons just stated, constitutional stability. "Dynamic or
long-term stability," write Mittal and Weingast, "requires the ability to
adapt existing institutions so that they continue to lower stakes in politics
and enable widespread coordination as circumstances change.AO In
other words, constitutional change is necessary for the same reasons as is
constitutional stability: to protect the system and its citizens against the
volatility, violence, and expropriation at risk by political officials
unmoored to workable legal rules.
The normative element remains missing in this account, however.
What values does the law serve in implementing broad governance goals
36. My focus is on legal mechanisms within the state system. This is myopic, to be
sure. Insofar as law should aim to reduce noise and distortion in the system, this can be
accomplished by mechanisms external to the state constitutional system. In fact, the
American constitutional tradition, and its commitment to federal supremacy, supposes
that federal government will exercise just this role. All that the idea of constitutionalism
in high fidelity adds to this classic view of American federalism is the idea that the
function of federal law and trans-state legal rules is, inter alia, to reduce distortions in the
system that would otherwise leave imperative social goals to the disruptive effects of
local political struggle and strategy. The Supreme Court's lodestar decisions in the
reapportionment cases are cogent illustrations of this function. See Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
37. See generally NORTH, WALLIS & WEINGAST, supra note 24.
38. See Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Federalism,
21 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 103 (2005); Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Barry R. Weingast, The
Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict, in CIVIL WARS,
INSECURITY, AND INTERVENTION 261, 261 (Barbara F. Walter & Jack Snyder eds., 1999).
39. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 59 (1996); Russell
Hardin, Constitutionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra
note 14, at 297-99.
40. Sonia Mittal & Barry R. Weingast, Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an
Application to Democratic Stability in America's First Century 4 (July 2010)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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through constitutional rules and interpretation? Change is about
adaptation to instabilities, but it is also about safeguarding principles of
justice, economic efficiency, and moral and political rights in new
circumstances. 4 1
Modalities of state constitutional change require an appreciation for
two key considerations: first, the political dynamics of constitutionalism
made palpable and compelling by political economy accounts that stress
the connection between institutions, rules, and what Daryl Levinson
insightfully labels the "puzzle of constitutional commitment.A 2 Second,
we have the normative elements of our constitutional ambitions and
expectations. Sensible strategies of change require us to navigate both of
these complex considerations.
The good news about state constitutional change is also the bad
news. The flexibility of state constitutional change processes,43
particularly in those states with direct initiative lawmaking,44 made
change easier to secure through formal modifications our normative
commitments. State constitutions can, in short, better keep up with the
tenor of the times. This is also the bad news, however, since the
malleability of the documents creates opportunities for precipitous action
and filling up the document with clutter, with policies that hardly warrant
the label "constitutional." Moreover, the susceptibility of state
constitutions to frequent change can undermine the kind of stability that
the L/PPT analyses prize. By shifting the focus to constitutional
adjustment when the spirit moves them, entrepreneurial political interest
groups can increase the stakes of politics and heighten, rather than
assuage, fear.
Workable constitutional change at the state level requires striking
this difficult balance. At a broad level, this means that reformers should
ideally choose one's spots carefully. Moreover, at a legal level, it means
that procedures should be in place to ensure that constitutional change is
carefully considered and modulated to take into account some of the
risks of frequent change and the threats such change poses to
constitutional stability and acceptability. In the next Part, I consider one
key doctrinal puzzle that purports to strike this balance.
II. DYNAMIC IN ACTION: THE REVISION/AMENDMENT PUZZLE
One of the persistent puzzles of state constitutional law is how best
to distinguish between a constitutional change through amendment and a
41. See, e.g., Hershkoff, supra note 5.
42. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of
Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REv. 657, 657-58 (2011).
43. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
44. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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change through revision.45 The basic distinction drawn in the case law is
between incremental changes, which are construed as amendments, and
changes of a large scope, which are deemed revisions.4 6 The latter sorts
of changes can be implemented through revision mechanisms provided
for in the state constitution; alternatively, they can be implemented
through the process of a constitutional convention.4 7 The reason this is a
matter of state constitutional law, rather than merely tactical choice, is
that it falls ultimately to courts to decide whether a particular change is
best interpreted as a revision, thereby triggering one route of change, or
an amendment, permitting another, typically less cumbersome, method.
Moreover, the rubber truly hits the road in instances in which the state
constitution provides for constitutional change through direct actions of
the people and thus without a legislative role.4 8 Changes through this
mechanism are limited to amendments; revisions require participation at
some point in the process by the legislature. 4 9 The distinction between
an amendment and a revision has palpable legal effects, and, in exploring
the distinction from the vantage point of this idea of constitutional law
and politics in high fidelity, we can illuminate the nature of state
constitutional development and, accordingly, state constitutionalism
more generally.
A. The Stakes, Legal and Otherwise
Constitutional revisions entail changes so fundamental and so
comprehensive that more elaborate processes are required. Requiring
revision proposals to run through a more formidable gauntlet serves two
overlapping functions: first, bringing into the process a representative
institution-the legislature-helps mediate between emerging popular
sentiment and more measured approaches to policymaking; and, second,
promoting deliberation in the constitutional change process extends the
scope of consideration to a wider, and presumably more deliberative,
group of stakeholders. Both of these functions can be broadly described
as "Madisonian," in that they introduce particular "auxiliary precautions"
45. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 359-97; Gerald Benjamin,
Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY 177 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006); Peter J. Galie &
Christopher Bopst, Changing State Constitutions: Dual Constitutionalism and the
Amending Process, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP. 27 (1996).
46. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 2 (describing doctrine).
47. See id.
48. See generally JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
29-63 (2009) (detailing amendment and revision issue).
49. Typically, in states that have the constitutional initiative system, a revision must
be considered and approved by the legislature before it is sent to the People to vote on for
final approval.
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in order to put brakes on extreme forms of democracy.5 0 The objective
of doing so is more controversial when invoked in the context of
initiative lawmaking. Such a scheme of lawmaking, of course, was
designed to work around the legislature.51  Requiring legislative
intervention is at least a caveat to this Progressive innovation; at most, it
is a direct antidote. Given the tension between Madisonian checks and
direct democracy, the procedural gauntlet proscribed by state
constitutions is confined to a particular strategy of change; that is, a
change that effects an overarching, global change to the basic
constitutional structure. Such revisions, and the procedural rules that
attach to revisions, are quite rare, as we would expect.
We the People, by contrast, are free to amend our constitutions
without legislative review, as this is the case in those states which have
initiative lawmaking as a means of constitutional change. Madisonian
checks are inapt in such a system; indeed, what Madison and other
framers feared is just what initiative lawmaking celebrates-the capacity
of ordinary citizens to rise up and amend their fundamental charter of
governance without legislative intervention or oversight. The
fundamental choice, then, is between constitutional change through
direct act of the people (amendment) and change through the crucible of
representative democracy (revision).
The stakes of this distinction are high.52 Casting a change into the
bin of amendment means that this change is more likely to be enacted
given strong public support; adding the legislature to the revision
process, ceteris paribus, has the opposite effect. Where legislators
would fear initiatives, especially in the circumstance in which the
initiative is directed at curtailing legislative power or reconfiguring the
structure of the institution, the impact of the court's interpretation of
revision and amendment will have important political repercussions.
While I will only speculate here about the relationship between these
consequences and judicial behavior, the role of the court in constitutional
interpretation is by any measure critical-indeed, frequently outcome
determinative-with regard to the success or failure of the proposed
initiative. 3 The focus in judicial doctrine, as I will explore in greater
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
51. See, e.g., JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN
STATE GOVERNMENT 81 (2002) ("Only the combined power of the people through a
system of direct democracy seemed sufficient to free the states from greedy clutches").
52. See Michael G. Colantuono, The Revision of American State Constitutions:
Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional Change, 75 CAL. L. REV.
1473, 1478-79 (1987).
53. As Cain and Bruce Noll describe the situation:
The critical strategic choice for a revision effort is whether to consider the full
spectrum of potentially attractive changes or to restrict deliberations to what is
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depth below, is on the scope of the initiative. The politics of
constitutional change suggest that the principal preoccupation of
legislators and motivated interest groups is the character and impact of
the initiative. In practical terms, combining the law and politics of the
revision/amendment distinction yields a multidimensional picture, one
that invites scrutiny from different angles and attitudes.
B. Judicial Doctrine
The traditional criteria for distinguishing between revisions and
amendments are porous, formalistic, and singularly unhelpful. Courts
typically look to the quantitative magnitude of the change, or else to the
question of how global the impact is on constitutional governance.
These are, to put it mildly, highly subjective criteria. They seldom do the
job of limiting judicial discretion; likewise, they seldom guide effectively
citizen and legislative reform efforts.
The difficulties are well illustrated by the California Supreme
Court's decisions in the same-sex marriage and Proposition 13 cases. In
Strauss v. Horton,54 the supreme court considered whether a
quantitatively small change to the state Constitution one that adds to the
document the statement "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California"-is an amendment or instead a
revision.55 The court held that this change was an amendment, rather
than a revision, on the idea that only those "far reaching changes in the
nature of our basic governmental plan" should be deemed revisions.56
"Proposition 8," the court declared, "simply changes the substantive
content of a state constitutional rule in one specific subject area," and
thus makes no fundamental change to the organization of governance
within the state.57  The court's argument is highly plausible as a
formalistic depiction of what the initiative does or does not do to the
structure of the California Constitution. But the reasoning of the court
eludes the question of what the proponents of the change were truly
politically feasible. A politically savvy agenda may be likely to succeed, but it
risks being revisionist and incremental. A bold, politically blind revision is
likely to make more enemies than friends... . The problem is an example of
the classic case of concentrated costs and diffuse benefits.
Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1517, 1529 (2009). See also Bruce E. Cain,
Constitutional Revision in California: The Triumph of Amendment over Revision, in 1
STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, supra note 45, at 59.
54. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009).
55. Id. at 59. California's Constitution provides that an "amendment" can be
enacted through the initiative directly, see CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8, subdiv. (b), but a
revision requires assent by the legislation, see CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 1-2.
56. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 98.
57. Id. at 99.
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looking to accomplish. Were they addressing a deep governance failure?
Clearly not. Were they reconsidering in a fundamental way the
underlying structure, objectives, or methodology of their state
constitutional system? Hardly. While in no way minimizing the impact
of this change on gay and lesbian Californians who seek marital options
available to straight co-citizens (that is, the ability to marry their
partners), the constitutional change could not be reasonably viewed as
addressing a constitutional failure, but, at most, a perceived mistake on
the part of the supreme court in its earlier decision invalidating same-sex
marriage bans on state constitutional grounds. And considered from a
practical dimension, the only added value of the legislature in
considering this change is the decreased likelihood, given the politics of
the matter, that the legislature would have acceded to this change-in
other words, the principal effect of defining the change as a revision is
the tactical one of blocking change.
Also problematic is the California court's decision in Amador
Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization,
the case in which the court considered the revision/amendment question
in the context of Proposition 13. In Amador, the court rejected the claim
that Proposition 13 was a revision, describing the change as only about
taxing powers.59 Viewed not only in hindsight, but also
contemporaneously with the change, the effect of Proposition 13 was a
radical transformation in the fiscal prerogatives of governmental entities
and a significant transformation in the fiscal relationship between state
and local governments.6 0 It is fair to view the initiative more generally
as an effort, albeit misguided in the eyes of many, to respond to a deep
constitutional failure-that is, the decentralization of fiscal authority and
the corresponding incentive of local governments to tax and spend at too
high a level. Insofar as the change addressed a perceived constitutional
failure, the supreme court should have deemed it a revision and thus
subject to legislative review. Likewise, the court's consideration of the
legislative term limit initiative (Proposition 140) in Legislature of
California v. Eu,6 1 elides the question of the underlying purpose and
effect of the change.62 In holding that this change was an amendment,
not a revision, the court implausibly asserted that the initiative "on its
face does not affect either the structure or the foundational powers of the
Legislature.... No legislative power is diminished or delegated to other
58. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal.
3d 208 (Cal. 1978).
59. See id. at 228-29.
60. See id. at 220.
61. Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991).
62. See id. at 1320.
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persons or agencies."63 It is only the qualification "on its face" that gives
the positive claim any plausibility; in any event, the structural impact on
legislative governance could well have been anticipated-indeed, it is
what proponents of term limits truly sought-and, insofar as this
initiative reflected an effort at tackling perceived legislative failures, it
should have been treated as a revision. Finally, to consider an example
from a different state, the structural change made to the Alaska
constitution in 1998 which removed the reapportionment authority from
the executive branch to an body comprised of appointees by all three
governmental branches was deemed an amendment rather a revision by
the Alaska Supreme Court in Bess v. Ulmer,64 despite the clear import of
the change being to address a structural problem that proponents believed
impaired governance in the state. This decision, too, avoids tackling the
central problem of what defects the proposed change aims to correct and,
indeed, what it causes. Drawing the legislature into this reform
conversation would improve the situation.
Does it matter whether the proposal focuses on a governance change
rather than something else? In a recent article, Bruce Cain and Roger
Noll argue that courts should distinguish between changes to individual
65
rights and changes to governmental institutions and processes. In their
view, "rights" changes should be deemed revisions and therefore should
go through a process that is required for revisions under the relevant state
constitution. "[T]he issue of who determines whether rights can be
expanded," they write, "seems to fall pretty clearly into the kind of
fundamental constitutional reform that was intended for the revision
process." 66  Structural changes, by contrast, could be implemented
through the amendment process and, where the constitution so provides,
directly through the people.67 The reason for this distinction is two-fold:
individual rights are intrinsically counter-majoritarian; to subject them to
reevaluation at the ballot box would threaten the values underlying the
creation and maintenance of these rights. Rather, reversals should be
regarded as "fundamental and taken only after an appropriate level of
deliberation and consensus." 68 By contrast, institutional changes should
be fair game for direct change. Institutions become entrenched, they
plausibly argue, by political considerations; thus, these same institutions
cannot be expected to undertake reforms which disempower embedded
63. Id.
64. Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1999).
65. See Cain & Noll, supra note 53, at 1530-36.
66. See id. at 1532.
67. See id. at 1536-42.
68. Id. at 1536.
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interest groups.69 The amendment process, in essence, should provide an
end run around these difficult obstacles.
This is a plausible argument, but viewed from a different vantage
point, Cain and Noll may have the matter backwards. Many of the
reasons for constitutional failure stem from defects in the ways in which
institutions function and govern. These defects are contextualized
through attention to the four sets of performance problems described
above. To be sure, the fact of entrenchment is certainly a real one; yet,
the mechanisms for constitutional change should properly track the
nature of the problems entailed. Where politics entrenches constitutional
pathologies, the solution lies in omnibus revision. The most sensible
mechanism for this revision is a constitutional convention or, failing that,
a comprehensive initiative that addresses the large issues at work and
incorporates tradeoffs (and perhaps, given the reality of politics,
compromise).70 It will not do, however, to characterize these
institutional changes as mere amendments because the impetus for
making these changes is that the constitutional architecture is rotten and
failure suggests revision.' What Cain and Noll label an obstacle can be
more plausibly viewed as an opportunity, that is, an opportunity for
dialogue between representatives and citizens, and between different
branches of government. The efficacy of these reforms, after all,
requires acquiescence by those impacted and charged with the
responsibilities to govern.
By way of an alternate presumption, therefore, we might think about
reforms to governmental structure as usually revisions, and therefore
subject to a more elaborate process of change. Rights changes, by
contrast, are within the prerogatives of the state citizenry. They may
reflect sinister motives and may be ill-advised, but that judgment rests on
normative considerations of the merits or demerits of the policy change,
not a judgment about the underlying logic of the state constitution and its
functions.
The harder cases in this regard will be ones in which the change
pertains to rights, but the substance of the change addresses a particular
process failure. Consider Raven v. Deukmejian,72 in which the California
69. Id. at 1537-38.
70. On the constitutional change process, see generally Tarr, "Introduction," supra
note 6.
71. Indeed, Cain and Noll acknowledge the strategic considerations animating these
change tactics when they note that "[s]ome institutional changes are so fundamental that
they need to be embedded in a constitution even if only to fix an existing flawed
provision. So it stands to reason that if revisions are increasingly difficult and
amendments are not, fundamental institutional reforms will increasingly be crammed into
the amendment process." Cain & Noll, supra note 53, at 1537.
72. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336 (Cal. 1990).
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Supreme Court examined a constitutional initiative which required that
state courts interpret certain constitutional provisions in lockstep with the
federal courts. In striking down this initiative on the grounds that it was
a revision rather than an amendment, the court insisted that the change
dealt with the large matter of independent constitutional interpretation
and was therefore a fundamental shift in the role of the state judiciary
under the constitution.73 This is the right result, although the rationale
could have been refined by emphasizing the stated reasons for the
initiative-to respond to a perceived constitutional failure, that is, the
expanding scope of judicial interpretations of certain rights and the
apparent incorrigibility between this approach and the philosophies
behind the rights at issue. Whether the perceived problems to which the
initiative was directed should be deemed a failure or, instead, embraced
as a wise take on California's criminal justice rights is subject to debate.
However, the rationale for the initiative was to address a constitutional
failure and, for that reason, the Court could credibly hold that the change
reflected a revision rather than an amendment.
The interpretive puzzle of the revision/amendment distinction
touches upon the larger question about how best to view the requisites of
constitutional change. After all, the key consequence of a holding that
the proposed change is an amendment, rather than a revision, is that a
particular process may be followed and, therefore, a different
complement of political interests, strategies, and struggles will be
implicated.
C. The Problem Writ Large
The preceding analysis reveals that judicial interpretations of the
revision/amendment distinction have been largely incoherent. Yet, the
incoherence of judicial approaches can hardly be chalked up to
unimaginative or careless judges. Rather, the essential difficulty stems
from an equivocation in the documents about the suitability and efficacy
of initiative lawmaking given its pitfalls and other important
constitutional objectives. The constitutional doctrine supposes there is a
cohesive line dividing revisions from amendments. Such a line is
illusory.
The problem is essentially a political one. While our ambition
might be (and I suggest ought to be) a constitutional law in high
fidelity,74 noise and distortion create predicaments that are hard to
resolve. Any line drawn by the courts between a proposal that can be
implemented directly as an amendment and one that requires legislative
73. Id. at 513-18.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
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participation will empower different clusters of interest groups. Whether
attentive to this dynamic or not, courts are basically helpless at
confronting this political dynamic through their interpretations of the
constitutional text.
One way out of this box is to take account in interpreting the
constitution of the structure of political incentives and patterns of
legislative behavior in the face of this initiative proposal. Courts might
ask this: What sorts of policy choices would result from one
interpretation versus another? We can think of revision versus
amendment analysis as basically a device by which courts can configure
the costs and benefits of political decision-making in order to promote
certain salutary results. However appealing or unappealing these
particular doctrinal recommendations, the key take-away point is that
judicial decision-making should be incentive compatible with political
choices. Constitutional decision rules should be in high fidelity, that is,
they should reduce noise and distortion within the broad political process
and, more specifically, between among courts, legislators, interest
groups, and the general public.
The difficulties with this suggested approach are two-fold: First, we
should always be skeptical of the courts' capacity to reset the agenda of
politics by their dispute-resolution interventions. What the legislature
would do if the court construed a proposal to be a revision rather than an
amendment is a counter-factual; and, like all forms of counter-factual
reasoning, we are asking more than one question at the same time. For
example, would this proposal be fashioned and packaged in this form if
supporters knew that it was facing a legislative gauntlet? Would
supporters turn away from formal constitutional change toward informal
processes such as judicial interpretations of the document or even federal
intervention? If, say, the supporters of Proposition 8 were doubtful that
the California legislature would approve a bill amending the state
constitution to overturn the decision in the In re Marriage cases, they
may well have pursued the strategy of judicial removal-a strategy that
worked in Iowa in the November 2010 election 7 5-or of a DOMA-like
strategy at the national level that would have supplanted California's
judicial ruling. Because we do not know the equilibrium outcome of a
political strategy, we should be wary of a judicial rule that sets out to
manage political conflict ex post. Recalling the L/PPT account of
legislative-judicial relations as a game in which both "parties" reason
inductively to conclusions about how they should act in anticipation of
75. See Maura Dolan, Rejection of Iowa Judges over Gay Marriage Raises Fears of
Political Influence, L.A. TIMES, November 5, 2010, available at http://articles.latimes.
com/2010/nov/05/local/la-me-gay-justice-20101105; A.G. Sulzberger, Voters Moving to
Oust Judges Over Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, September 24, 2010, at Al.
1090 [Vol. 115:4
CHANGE THAT MATTERS
the actions of others, 6 it is not clear that courts would be able to solve
these difficulties by a thumb on the revision/amendment scale, one way
or the other.n Second, calibrating judicial doctrine to the type of
proposal at issue is a very slippery slope. Constitutional reform efforts
are multifaceted; some changes reshuffle the deck of political power in
the way noted by Cain and Noll, while others reconfigure the pattern of
rights, duties, and commitments. We might doubt the ability of courts to
truly track the kind of issues at the heart of certain reform proposals.
The measure in California invalided in Raven, for example, was about
the structure of legal decision-making in the state, (in other words, it was
about governance) but it was at root a law-and-order initiative designed
to reign in "activist" judges who, it was charged, coddled criminals.
Decoupling the rights orientation of constitutional proposals from their
structural nature and impact will be difficult in a range of potential cases.
Given these difficulties, I can find some solace in an approach that
is by and large a distant second-best; that is, second best to a hypothetical
approach that (a) is tractable by courts interpreting their respective
constitutions, and (b) gets the political incentives exactly right. Given
the difficulty in realizing these objectives simultaneously, the most
sensible approach would be one that looks squarely at the connection
between the objectives of the reform efforts and the process that
supporters turn to implement these objectives. The effort to end-run the
legislature, while plausible when viewed in light of the extreme
Progressive reforms that brought the constitutional initiative system into
being, should be modulated, where possible, through careful attention
to the values and benefits, from the system's perspective, of having
additional Madisonian-type checks.7 9  The term limits decision in
California,so for example, may have come out the other way under this
approach; so, too might have the Alaska reapportionment decision
described above.81 By contrast, change proposals that speak to a broad
public commitment to a new way of solving social problems, even if this
commitment changes some key structural features of the document in the
course of these efforts, should presumptively be determined to be
amendments and thus capable of being enacted without the intervention
76. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20.
77. This observation tracks the larger insight of influential political science work
which despairs about the prospect of serious judicial "fixing" of political pathologies.
See, e.g., GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW'S ALLURE: How LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES
AND KILLS POLITICS (2009); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
78. See TEAFORD, supra note 51, at 81; see generally MATSUSAKA, supra note 8.
79. See Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, supra note 8.
80. See generally Legislature of Cal. v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991).
81. See generally Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1999).
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of the legislature. Under this standard, Raven might have come out the
other way-after all, it is a major change, but one that speaks to the
public's preference, for better or worse, to have a lockstep approach to
constitutional interpretation in the area of criminal defendants' rights.
To be sure, this suggested decision rule-more of a presumption,
actually-is inferior to an interpretive approach which would reduce
noise and distortion and leave us with a constitutional rule in high
fidelity. Such an ambition, for the reasons just described, may be
elusive. Yet, it can make better sense of the distinction by pushing
toward other modes of constitutional reform, in particular, a
constitutional convention, in which a range of interests can be
accommodated and in which strategy, while persistent and inevitable,
can be counteracted by more transparent checks and balances.82
III. ON THE SUBJECT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE MORE
GENERALLY
Reasoning from positive political theories of constitutionalism to
prescriptive analysis requires us, as an initial matter, to be conspicuous
and clear about our assumptions underlying the normative project. For
my part, my assumptions are framed around a strategic account of
legislative-judicial relations, one that sees government officials as
essentially in competition with one another and, within the structure of
their institutions, in competition with other institutions which might,
unchecked, threaten the ability of these officials to pursue their own
agendas. Furthermore, constitutionalism at the state level (not unlike the
82. Courts would do well, I have suggested, by attending to the political dynamics of
change strategies in order to reduce, as best as possible, distortions in the system.
However, the criterion of reducing noise and distortion cannot be dislodged from the
larger objectives of the constitutional system. Some of the political dynamics at work
and, moreover, the struggles between courts and legislators and between legislators and
"We the People" are the result of choices embedded in the documents. They are, in other
words, deliberate choices, not anomalies. Indeed, the opacity of the revision/amendment
distinction may well track not only the ambivalence of the Progressive era constitutional
framers but, more intriguingly, their interest in having politics play out in the process of
constitutional reform. The conventional take on the connection between constitutional
implementation and constitutional design is that constitutions are designed by their
framers to work; and the ideas of incentive compatibility and constitutional law and
politics in high fidelity build on the normative assumption that workability is the
principal objective, the sine qua non of constitutionalism.
However, what if we look at the matter from a very different angle? What if we
consider state constitutionalism as the product of merely self-serving political choices,
made by shrewd officials, over the long expanse of American history, and not grounded
in a general, public-regarding logic of constitutional workability? This remains a vexing
question, one which calls upon, my instinct tells me, a different kind of normative
analysis. Whether and to what extent we would end up at basically the same place is a
question I am in no position to answer.
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national level, in this respect) is organized around the incentives of
political officials to resolve overlapping dilemmas through constitutional
strictures and, as well, on our interest as citizens (in this case, citizens of
the state) to implement our objectives through constitutional
architecture. 3  From these foundational assumptions, I described how
law can meet the demands of politics by being attentive to the incentives
of political officials; specifically, the relative compatibility of legal rules
to these incentives. The extended illustration provided in Part II of the
revision/amendment distinction was intended to sharpen this analysis.
But what of state constitutional change more generally? We do well
to consider state constitutions as a major venue in which we construct
and implement the goals of the pertinent polity. Given the complex
dynamics of law and politics and the difficulties of achieving the
appealing goal of constitutionalism in high fidelity, we should
concentrate in our pursuit of good governance on developing rules which
improve the likelihood of "good" change and reduce the likelihood of
either "bad" change or unintended consequences of otherwise appealing
reforms. Bracketing the normatively laden questions of what
distinguishes the good from the bad in this account, we can readily
imagine procedures that moves us fruitfully in the right direction. Let
me close this essay by suggesting a few promising guidelines.
First, a formal process of change that includes more, rather than
fewer, stakeholders will maximize, ceteris paribus, the chances of
consensus. This may seem counter-intuitive, given the presumably
greater capacity of smaller groups over larger groups to deliberate over
policy disagreements. However, it is important to have a reform process
in which all the relevant parties are included. We know, after all, that
where some parties are excluded, they will, under the logic of L/PPT,
just take their complaints to other fora.84 So far as venues for
considering the interests of multiple stakeholders, constitutional
conventions will serve this purpose better than either legislator or
plebiscitary processes. This may or may not rest on the belief that large
groups in collective choice settings will engage in constructive dialogue
and deliberation, but on the less controversial belief that forging
compromise will be more likely in an environment in which preferences
are more transparent and thus decision-makers are more accountable.
Such conventions, as we learned from our 18th century founding story,
83. Elsewhere, I have said more about the purposes of state constitutions, but this
truncated account will do for my purposes. For more information, see generally
Rodriguez, State Constitutional Failure, supra note 35.
84. See, e.g., Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the Decline
of Deliberation: A Dilemma in State Constitutional Reform, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1291
(1995).
10932011]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
create serious risks of constitutional radicalism, which is the price we
pay for engaging directly first principles of governance. But it is a price
worth paying in pursuit of a constitutional system that is modem,
effective, and broadly acceptable. And if it is any comfort to folks
worried about radical experimentation, the historical experience with
state constitutional conventions, as John Dinan has described, suggests
that moderate, even technocratic, initiatives will likely win out over
wackier, far-flung proposals.
Second, major constitutional change through plebiscitary forms runs
risks that cannot be easily curtailed or controlled. To be sure, the
Progressive reforms that brought to many states in the West and Midwest
direct constitutional lawmaking was designed to work against legislative
intransigence and to implement the will of the People in ways that would
often be dramatic.8 6 But as many critics of direct democracy excesses
have noted over the past several decades, initiative lawmaking introduces
its own noise and distortions in public governance. The choice may
ultimately not be between the wise populace and obstructionist, private-
interest legislators, as Hiram Johnson, Howard Jarvis, and dyed-in-the-
wool advocates of direct democracy suggest. Rather, the result may be
democratic goals achievable through streamlined lawmaking and goals
formulated and implemented through a complex machinery of
representative democracy, with checks and balances, transparency, and
electoral accountability-in short, the Madisonian, rather than the
Jeffersonian, ideal. Yes, I have surely stacked the deck in making the
point. However, the point is not to reposition the order between
plebiscitary and representative lawmaking, but to fill out the picture so
we can make comparative evaluations of competing modalities of
change. Setting up a fruitful series of change procedures first requires a
candid engagement with the lawmaking and policy implementations that
are embedded in state constitutions. Next, closely considering whether
these procedures do and whether there ought to be a thumb push the
scale in favor of one lawmaking process over another.
Third, we should draw a distinction when we think about structural
reform between what I will call hard and soft wiring. When we think of
our hard-wired constitutions, we see constitutional structure as
imbedding certain rules and institutions into the document. This is not
epiphenomenal, but is purposive and deliberate. And we see the function
of judicial review is to police political officials to ensure that this
85. See DINAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION, supra note 3, at 7-28.
86. See TEAFORD, supra note 51, at 81.




structure will govern. 88 This hard-wiring raises its own unique problems.
First, and most obviously, hard-wired rules allow for limited variability
and adaptation. This is particularly problematic, as we see from the
national context, where these hard-wired rules are exceptionally difficult
to remove. Moreover, the impact of hard-wired rules may be intended or
unintended, depending upon the circumstances. One example mentioned
profitably by my colleague, Sanford Levinson, in his terrific book, "Our
Undemocratic Constitution," 8 9 is the two plus months period behind the
popular election for President and the Inauguration (a period that was
originally even longer!). 90 While the purpose of this hard-wired rule was
to accommodate a presidential transition in a world in which
communication and transportation was slow, it has the unfortunate
consequence in modern times of limiting the ability of the newly elected
president to confront important social problems immediately and
ambitiously.91 The lame-duck incumbent has none of the incentives, but
the entire burden, to address these pressing matters in the dwindling, but
not insignificant, time remaining to him.
The dilemma faced by constitutional designers, of course, is how to
construct rules and institutions that serve the larger objectives of
constitutionalism over time while guarding against serious problems of
obsolescence and self-dealing.9 2 Elsewhere, I have considered state
constitutional failure by focusing on certain governance problems that
result from a panoply of rules, structures, and institutions.93 Some of
these-for instance, the plural executive and tax and expenditure
limitations (TELs)-are hard-wired into the document. Others are soft-
wired, in the sense that the constitutional structure drives political
officials to develop rules and institutions that they would otherwise not
do but for this structure. Direct democracy, for example, encourages
legislators to make distinct political choices.9 4 For instance, choices like
the short-changing of post-secondary education in a policy environment
88. See generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Scope of
Judicial Review, in NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61, 61; cf James
Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893) (noting that the courts' role is to correct clear mistakes by
legislators).
89. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (Oxford
University Press 2006).
90. March, rather than January. See id at 75.
91. Seeidat98-99.
92. However, as Adrian Vermeule reminds us, we might be content with what he
calls a "second-best" constitutionalism. See Adrian Vermeule, Hume's Second-Best
Constitutionalism, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 421, 421 (2003). After all, constitutional structure
can produce "compensating adjustments that ensure constitutional equilibrium." Id.
93. See generally Rodriguez, State Constitutional Failure, supra note 35.
94. See generally Garrett, supra note 8.
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in which legislators are constrained in raising revenues (because of
TELs) and required to spend a certain amount of the budget on a
particular policy illustrated the ways in which a hard-wired element of
the constitution incentivizes legislators to make soft-wired rules.
Finally, structures of constitutional structure must distinguish
between formal and informal processes. There indeed may be a
constitution "outside" the Constitution, as Ernest Young puts it,95 or a
"small-c" constitutionalism, as William Eskridge and John Ferejohn
describe it, that is more appropriate to our modern republic than the
clunky 1 8 1h-1 9th century version which represents our "Large-C"
constitution. 9 6 But this only points us in the useful direction of more
eclectic strategies of change. Serious questions remain (as, to be fair,
these leading theorists of non-formal constitutionalism well understand)
about how to choose between formal and informal change mechanisms.
That state constitutions are more susceptible to formal changes given
their comparatively liberal amendment procedures provides a temptation
for proceeding more often than not through these formal mechanisms,
just as, likewise, the rigidity of the U.S. Constitution pushes in the
direction of extra-constitutional devices. But drawing workable lines
between the circumstances in which formal modification is called for and
when it is not raises key questions at the heart of any practical theory of
state constitutional development. My own contribution to this serious
debate is a modest one: Politics matters in this choice; that is,
considering how constitutional reform impacts upon, and is impacted by,
political strategy and tactics is the best place to start in fashioning an
agenda of change.
IV. CONCLUSION
State constitutional development must resonate with a full-bodied
account of state constitutionalism more generally. Our constitutional
objectives, where we should start our analysis in every respect, are
myriad, contestable, and deeply political in every salient sense of that
term. To understand state constitutional law, we must understand state
constitutional politics. While an imperative for any dimension of public
law, it is an especially potent edict in the state constitutional context,
given factors and circumstances that are pronounced and enduring in the
95. See generally Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117
YALE L.J. 408 (2007).
96. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1-24 (Yale University Press 2010) (describing contrast
between "small-c" constitutionalism, reflected principally in statutes and administrative




American states and their respective constitutional traditions. Any effort
to participate in the process of state constitutional development, whether
through formal or informal means, must attend to the concrete goals and
predicaments of the state constitutional order.
The metaphor of constitutional law/politics in high fidelity helps
sharpen, at the very least, the goal of constitutional theory. Less clear is
whether it can help us with the goal of optimal constitutional
interpretation. One conclusion we can draw from a close look at the
amendment/revision distinction in state constitutional law is that courts
face difficult challenges in turning the insight that politics matters greatly
into interpretive approaches. Still and all, framing the interpretive issue
around a realistic view of law's potential to meet political realities and,
correlatively, around political impacts on legal rules and decision-
making at least turns us in the right direction.
Moreover, when we focus in earnest on constitutional reform, we
should look to those procedures and processes that navigate between the
competing demands of law and of politics. Constitutional change is, at
bottom, a collective choice process involving multiple stakeholders and
myriad challenges. A clearer sense of the noise and distortion intrinsic to
political struggle and, in particular, to the strategic relationship among
purposive judges, legislators, and ordinary citizens will help us to make
best use of the extant mechanisms of constitutional reform. This sense
will also enrich the project of developing new mechanisms of reform to
accommodate the modern needs and demands. Given the crushing
demands on state governance in this early part of the 2 1st century, this
project is certainly a pressing one.
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